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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we extend the analysis of Mitchell (2001) who opened with the statement: “the 
unemployed cannot find jobs that are not there!”. The contrast between the missives of 
microeconomics, where cost minimisation is a necessary condition for efficiency and profit 
maximisation, and policy practice conditioned by the NAIRU approach in this regard is stark 
– given the high costs in terms of unemployment and corresponding waste of resources. At 
the macroeconomic level, the dominant economic orthodoxy has, since the mid-1970s, 
cajoled policy makers to follow policies that have deliberately and persistently deflated their 
economies under the false impression that the role of policy is to ensure the economy is 
operating at the natural rate of unemployment. The profession seems to have become 
obsessed with supply side remedies to the high unemployment, despite the fact that most 
economies have failed to generate sufficient jobs over the last 25 years to match the growth in 
their labour forces. The costs of unemployment have seemingly been ignored (Mitchell and 
Watts, 1997; Watts and Mitchell, 2000). There is now considerable evidence that rises in 
unemployment are highly persistent and cumulative and permanent costs are incurred if active 
policy does not seek to reduce it quickly (Mitchell, 1993, 2001). There is also mounting 
evidence against the dynamics implied by the NAIRU approach (Chang, 1997; Fair, 2000; 
Akerlof et al, 2000). 
 
Modigliani, who introduced the term NAIRU to the economics profession (Modigliani and 
Papademos, 1975), has recently argued that (Modigliani, 2000: 3) that 
Unemployment is primarily due to lack of aggregate demand. This is mainly the 
outcome of erroneous macroeconomic policies… [the decisions of Central Banks] … 
inspired by an obsessive fear of inflation, … coupled with a benign neglect for 
unemployment … have resulted in systematically over tight monetary policy 
decisions, apparently based on an objectionable use of the so-called NAIRU approach. 
The contractive effects of these policies have been reinforced by common, very tight 
fiscal policies (emphasis in original) 
 
In this paper we examine the evidence needed to support this statement from Modigliani, by 
comparing the experience of the Australian economy to that of the Netherlands over the last 
30 odd years. We show that in particular misguided government policy has been responsible 
for the persistently high unemployment and the cumulative and permanent losses to social and 
economic well-being entailed.  
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The comparison between Australia and the Netherlands is interesting because they share 
many features yet in other ways are quite distinct. Both are relatively small, highly developed 
open economies with a well-developed system of social security. However, Australia relies on 
exports of primary commodities, whereas the Netherlands due to the more diverse nature of 
its exports enjoys a more stable terms of trade. The feature of the Dutch economy that 
separates it from others, including Australia, is that it forms a transport hub for major trade in 
Europe and beyond. Moreover, the Netherlands has experienced robust employment growth 
of  2.9 per cent per annum over the period 1995–2000, whereas the corresponding figure for 
Australia was 1.6 per cent. As a consequence the rate of unemployment in the Netherlands in 
1999 was 3.3 per cent, compared to 7.2 per cent in Australia. However, the apparent success 
in combating unemployment in the Netherlands is partly clouded by the huge increase in 
inactivity since the early 1980s. While there were 267 thousand persons officially 
unemployed in 2000, the number of disabled workers entitled to benefits was recorded to be 
over 900 thousand! In terms of the labour force, this group (including sickness benefits 
recipients) has more than doubled. The percentage in terms of the labour force rose from 9 
percent in 1970 to 20 percent in 1980. It remained at that level more or less ever since. This 
feature induced, for instance, OECD (1998) to report that, when defined in a “broad” sense, 
unemployment in the Netherlands would reach around 25 percent of the labour force (see also 
Muysken, 2001).  
 
Section 2 challenges the view held by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (LNJ) (1991), among 
others, that the rise in unemployment can be attributed to reducing search effectiveness 
among the unemployed. According to this view, search effectiveness has declined as welfare 
benefits have risen. We argue that jobs have to exist before search can be effective. Section 3 
traces the main determinants and we conclude that it is aggregate demand that dominates 
employment generation. Section 4 digresses into the supply side explanations of 
unemployment to show that they lack explanatory credibility. We then show in Section 5 that 
it is deficiencies in policy and business investment that explain the deficiency in aggregate 
demand. The final section challenges the view that the private sector are able to produce 
enough jobs if they are less constrained by regulation. We argue that full employment requires 
a strong job creation role by the public sector. Concluding remarks follow. 
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2. Jobs have to exist before search can be effective 
 
Over the last 25 years, as unemployment has risen and persisted at high levels, orthodox 
economists have concentrated on the supply side of the labour market, hypothesising that full 
employment now occurs at much higher unemployment rates than in the past. Piore (1979: 
10) reminds us that: 
Presumably, there is an irreducible residual level of unemployment composed of 
people who don’t want to work, who are moving between jobs, or who are 
unqualified. If there is in fact some such residual level of unemployment, it is not one 
we have encountered in the United States. Never in the post war period has the 
government been unsuccessful when it has made a sustained effort to reduce 
unemployment. (emphasis in original) 
 
Figure 1 plots the UV ratio for Australia from September 1966 to December 2000 and for the 
Netherlands (using annual data) from 1966 to 2000. Notwithstanding sectoral variations, at 
first blush, we are dealing with a heavily demand-constrained economy. Since the mid-
seventies there were on average 11 unemployed for each vacancy in Australia, and 7 
unemployed in the Netherlands.2 We repeat the opening sentence: The unemployed cannot 
find jobs that are not there! 
 
Figure 1  UV ratio for the Australia and the Netherlands, 1966-2000 
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(a) The Netherlands 1966-2000 
Source: Australia, ABS AUSSTATS, NIF current series data. Netherlands CPB (2001) and Muysken et al. 
(1994) and Ministry of Social Affairs (2001). The ratio is total unemployed (000s) to unfilled vacancies (000’s). 
Australian data is quarterly, whereas the Netherlands is annual. 
 
Figure 2 shows the unemployment rate on the left hand scale plotted against the sum of 
employment and vacancies (as a percentage of the labour force) as a measure of labour 
 5
demand on the right hand scale (inverted). The correspondence between the two series is 
striking and a major part of the variation in the unemployment rate appears to be associated 
with the evolution of demand. 
 
Figure 2  Labour demand and unemployment, Australia and the Netherlands, 1966-2000 
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(b) The Netherlands 
Source: see Figure 1. 
 
Modigliani (2000) has presented similar graphs for France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, which shows that as job availability declines the unemployment rate rises, with the 
concomitant outcomes that the search process lengthens, as does the average duration of 
unemployment. Modigliani (2000: 5) concluded, “Everywhere unemployment has risen 
because of a large shrinkage in the number of positions needed to satisfy existing demand.” 
 
Part of this upward movement in unemployment could also be explained from shifts in the 
unemployment-vacancy (UV) relationship, the so-called Beveridge curve. Much has been 
made of the shift in this relationship over time. Figure 3 plots the vacancies (thousands) 
against unemployment (thousands) for both Australia and the Netherlands from 1966 to 2000. 
The outward shifts are clearly shown. The three noticeable outward shifts in the Australian 
Beveridge curve occurred in 1974, 1982, and in 1991. Similarly a minor outward shift 
occurred in the Netherlands in 1975 followed by a strong outward shift in 1981. It is no 
surprise that these shifts are driven by cyclical downturns rather than any autonomous supply 
side shifts. Mitchell (1987) has previously shown that structural imbalances (supply 
constraints) can be the result of cyclical variations and can be resolved, in part, by attenuating 
the amplitude of the downturns. 
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Figure 3  Beveridge curve, Australia and The Netherlands, 1966-2000 
0
50
100
150
200
250
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
unemployment (000s)
va
ca
nc
ie
s 
(0
00
s)
1974
1982
1991
 
(a) Australia 1966-2000 
0
50
100
150
200
250
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
unemployment (000s)
va
ca
nc
ie
s 
(0
00
s)
1981
1975
 
(b) The Netherlands 1966-2000 
 
Source: see Figure 1. 
 
LNJ (1991: 4, 38) argue that these shifts are due to a failure of the unemployed to seek work 
as effectively as before. They explain the outward shift in the European Beveridge curve by 
“a fall in the search effectiveness …among the unemployed” (1991: 38). LNJ (1991: 268) also 
claim that the UV shift has been due to “rise in long-term unemployment, which reduces 
search effectiveness…” What does this mean? LNJ (1991: 38) offer the following 
explanation: “Either the workers have become more choosey in taking jobs, or firms become 
more choosey in filling vacancies (owing for example to discrimination against the long-term 
unemployed or to employment protection legislation.)” They suggest that the first reason 
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dominates. There is clearly an observational equivalence problem in attempting to test for 
this. Search time will lengthen when there are large cyclical downturns and the probability of 
gaining a job decreases. With UV ratios averaging 11.1 or 6.9 unemployed persons per 
vacancy over the last 26 years, it is a fallacy of composition to conclude that if all individuals 
reduced their reservation wage to the minimum (to maximise supply-side search 
effectiveness) that unemployment would significantly fall (given the small estimated real 
balance effects in most studies). Further, unless growth in labour requirements is symmetrical 
and labour force growth steady on both sides of the business cycle, the pool of unemployed 
can rise and remain persistently high (Mitchell, 2001). We elaborate on this point below. 
 
Table 1 Beveridge curve regression, Australia and the Netherlands 
 Australia The Netherlands 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 1.47 (27.3) 1.10 (16.2) 
LVR -0.09 (2.11) -1.03 (15.4) 
PLTU 0.02 (9.13) 0.01 (4.28) 
RECESSION_2   0.25 (2.14) 
RECESSION_3 0.04 (2.03)   
RECESSION_1*LVR   0.62 (6.98) 
RECESSION_2*LVR -0.21 (4.26)   
     
R-squared 0.83  0.98  
S.E. as % of mean LUR 3.88  8.37  
Source: See Figure 1. The regression for Australia uses quarterly data from March 1978 to June 2000. The 
regression for The Netherlands uses annual data from 1966 to 2000. The dependent variable was the log of the 
unemployment rate. VR is the log of the vacancy rate, PLTU is the proportion of long-term unemployment.  
 
To examine the impact of recessions on the UV relationship and look for the impact of rising 
long-term unemployment we ran a simple regression. We use the proportion of long-term 
unemployed to total unemployment (PLTU) as the “search effectiveness” variable as 
suggested by LNJ (1991). We will show below that this variable is itself affected by 
recession, which has significant implications for the credibility of the supply side story. We 
also include dummy variables: for the Netherlands Recession_1 (zero until 1975, unity 
thereafter) and Recession_2 (zero until 1981, unity thereafter), and for Australia Recession_2 
(zero until March 1983, unity thereafter) and Recession_3 (zero until March 1991, unity 
thereafter).3 They are included as intercept dummies and are allowed to interact with the 
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vacancy rate to test for slope changes. The dependent variable is the log of the Vacancy Rate 
(LVR).4 
 
The results shown in Table 1 reveal that the UV relationship is displaced by the rise in long-
term unemployment, but the recessions exacerbate the outward shift. All recessions appear to 
have worsened the trade-off between unfilled vacancies and unemployment. To summarise 
this recession-driven outward shift in the UV relationship, we calculated the rate of 
unemployment at which unemployment would equal vacancies. The results are summarised in 
Table 2 and clearly illustrate the outward shifts of the UV curve after each recession. This 
evidence is strongly supportive of the hysteresis hypothesis. 
 
Table 2 Rate of unemployment equal to vacancies, Australia and the Netherlands5 
 Australia The Netherlands 
Pre Recession 1 0.87 1.90 
Recession 1 4.53 2.64 
Recession 2 5.06 4.22 
Source: Table 1. 
Figure 4 shows that the relationship between long-term unemployment and the unemployment 
rate is very close. As unemployment rises (falls), the proportion of long-term unemployed 
rises (falls) with a lag. Several studies have formally examined this relationship. Chapman et 
al. (1992), EPAC (1996), and Mitchell (2000b, 2001) have all found that a rising proportion 
of long-term unemployed is not a separate problem from that of the general rise in 
unemployment in Australia. However, it is remarkable that the proportion of long-term 
unemployment is much higher in the Netherlands, compared to Australia, and hardly falls 
when unemployment falls, a characteristic common across most European countries. The 
notion that a relatively more generous welfare system in Europe may explain the latter 
phenomenon, motivated the supply-side policy emphasis that OECD governments have 
adopted over the last two decades. However, unemployment tripled in two years in the 
Netherlands, starting from an unprecedented height already in 1981, and that also provides a 
plausible explanation for the surge in long-term unemployment. The persistence then can be 
explained by the observation that it is very hard for an economy to absorb such a large 
number of long-term unemployed people. As is reported in Muysken (2001) the strong job 
growth in the Netherlands was mainly favourable to new entrants to the labour market. So 
while LNJ (1991) may claim search effectiveness declines and this contributes to rising 
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unemployment rates, it is highly probable (as shown in Figure 2) that both are caused by 
insufficient demand for labour. The policy response then is entirely different. 
 
Figure 4 Proportion of LTU and unemployment rate, Australia and the Netherlands 
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(a) Australia 1978-2000 
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(b) The Netherlands 1966-2000 
Source: For Australia ABS AUSSTATS database, The Netherlands CPB (2001) and Muysken et al. (1994). 
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3. Aggregate demand generates jobs 
 
Modigliani (2000) argues that the level of aggregate demand rather than the labour force 
(supply) determines the level of employment. Figure 5 shows the annual percentage growth in 
real final demand and employment from 1965 to 2000 as a way of appreciating the 
correspondence between demand dynamics and employment dynamics. 
 
Figure 5 Annual percentage growth in demand and employment 
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(a) Australia 1965-2000 
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(b) The Netherlands 1965-2000 
Source: ABS AUSSTATS database for Australia and CPB (2001) for the Netherlands. Employment is annual 
percentage growth in total farm and non-farm employment, demand is the annual percentage growth in real final 
demand (Gross National Expenditure at 1998/99 prices for Australia, GDP at 1980  prices for the Netherlands). 
 
The major shifts in employment fortunes are closely related to similar directional shifts in real 
demand. Note that in Australia following the 1974 recession, which in relative terms was not 
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as severe as the two later recessions (1982 and 1991), real demand growth was subdued. 
Australia has never recovered from the increase in unemployment that coincided with this 
period. The same holds after the recession in the Netherlands in 1981.  
 
Another way of viewing this relationship is from the unemployment side. Figure 6 shows the 
relationship between the growth in real demand (expressed as the 5-year moving average of 
the annual percentage changes) and the unemployment since 1960. We use the smoothed 
series to provide a better depiction of the downward trend in real demand over the period that 
unemployment began to become a problem. 
 
Figure 6 Real demand growth and the unemployment rate, Australia and the Netherlands 
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(b) The Netherlands 1960-2000 
Source: ABS AUSSTATS database for Australia and CPB (2001) for the Netherlands. The unemployment rate is 
the aggregate unemployment rate and demand growth is the 5-year moving average of the annual percentage 
changes in real final demand (Gross National Expenditure at 1998/99 prices for Australia, GDP at 1980 prices 
for the Netherlands). 
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The evidence leaves no doubt that the rise in unemployment was associated with a marked 
deficiency in aggregate demand. Had aggregate demand not fallen in the mid-1970s and 
remained well below the 1960s levels for the next decade, the unemployment rate would not 
have risen significantly in Australia. Further, subsequent growth in employment (given the 
on-going labour supply growth) would have been able, as in previous recessions in the 1960s, 
to absorb those in the unemployment pool. The severity of the demand restraint meant that the 
unemployed pool rose far beyond what could be absorbed in any normal recovery. 
 
Again a similar story can be told for the Netherlands, where aggregate demand fell sharply in 
the early 1980s. However, the recovery of unemployment was much better relative to the  
Australian experience. To a certain extent this apparent recovery is biased due to the 
enormous amount of inactivity in the Netherlands, as we indicated in the introduction. 
Whatever is the conclusion about these supply effects, there is still solid support in both 
countries that unemployment can be associated with a marked deficiency in aggregate 
demand. 
 
4. A digression: supply side explanations of unemployment 
 
The orthodox response may be that we are ignoring the role of labour costs in this analysis. 
To elaborate that contention, we analyse the notion of equilibrium unemployment from a 
theoretical perspective using the model of LNJ (1991) as a starting point.6 While there have 
been various frameworks used in the literature to explain unemployment as an equilibrium 
phenomenon, the LNJ (1991) approach embracing search unemployment in a wage 
bargaining environment has been the most influential. The so-called NAIRU-approach, 
derived from the LNJ (1991) framework, has also been the dominant force in debates on 
policy measures to combat unemployment. Therefore we believe it is constructive to consider 
that approach and the various extensions that have been developed in response to criticisms. 
 
LNJ (1991) start with a right-to-manage bargaining model, in which a bargained real wage 
has to adjust to a product real wage offered by the firms. In equilibrium the rate of 
unemployment is consistent with both wage setting and price setting behaviour; in absence of 
inflation surprises, it is determined solely by the factors determining wage and price setting. 
Since in equilibrium surprises are absent (constant inflation), this rate of unemployment is 
called the NAIRU (Non-Accelerating-Inflation-Rate of Unemployment). It is considered to be 
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equilibrium unemployment because the system tends to converge to it, as the inflation-averse 
authorities will use aggregate policy to keep price acceleration low. So it is the conduct of 
fiscal and monetary policy that determined the fluctuations in actual unemployment around its 
NAIRU level (Nickell and van Ours, 2000: 142). 
 
The NAIRU is affected by institutional factors like benefit ratios, minimum wages, bargaining 
coordination by unions, employment protection and labour taxes. Additionally, commodity 
prices and skill mismatch can play a role. However, as a result of the assumed production 
structure – a Cobb-Douglas production function is used – and the assumption of a constant 
benefit rate, neither labour augmenting technological change, nor changes in the capital stock 
or costs of capital can impact on the NAIRU in this model. That is a serious shortcoming and 
maintains the earlier conceptions of the natural rate hypothesis where the steady-state 
unemployment rate is not affected by fiscal or monetary policy. No scope is given for 
aggregate demand, technological change or capital costs to impact on unemployment.  
 
It therefore is not surprising that the NAIRU-approach has been contested on precisely these 
grounds. Blanchard (1997) argues that the price-setting curve is derived from a model in 
which prices are set as a mark-up on marginal costs. In that context, wage costs relative to 
capital costs are relevant. Therefore capital costs should be included in the price setting 
equation. Moreover, the real interest rate may also affect hiring costs, investment in firm-
specific human capital and costs of creating customer markets (Phelps, 1994; Phelps and 
Zoega, 1998). So for various reasons, the NAIRU will increase with the real interest rate. This 
induced Phelps and Blanchard to argue that the high unemployment in Europe in the 1980s 
was caused by the high real interest rates. 
 
Further, Rowthorn (1999)  shows that even if capital costs are ignored, the capital stock will 
be an argument in demand for labour and hence in the price setting. The impact of the capital 
stock disappears only when a Cobb Douglas production function is used (unit elasticity of 
substitution). However, since empirical studies find this elasticity to be well below unity, a 
decrease in the capital stock due to an increase in the rate of interest will lead to a decrease in 
labour demand and a rise in unemployment. Finally, whereas in LNJ (1991) the neutrality of 
unemployment with respect to technical change is a result of the production structure (unit 
elasticity of substitution) and institutional features (constant benefit rate), Rowthorn (1999: 
422) emphasises that in his analysis investment should be “on average just sufficient to keep 
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pace with ... any bias in technical progress.” From a somewhat different perspective, 
Blanchard (2000) also concludes that the slowdown in Total Factor Productivity growth can 
explain much of the unemployment in Europe, which occurred up until the 1980s.  
 
In Blanchard’s analysis actual and equilibrium unemployment are closely related because they 
are affected by the same shocks. For instance, while an increase in the interest rate will 
increase actual unemployment due to decreased aggregate demand (in particular investment), 
the corresponding decrease in the capital stock will increase equilibrium unemployment. In 
that way he also implicitly counters the claim by Modigliani (2000) that the observed strong 
correlation between actual unemployment and the net investment rate is due to aggregate 
demand effects.7  
 
Another reason why actual and equilibrium unemployment are closely related is because of 
hysteresis. Although Blanchard is one of the researchers who introduced this concept in the 
literature (Blanchard and Summers, 1986) – he claims always to “have felt some uneasiness in 
doing so, feeling that it remained loose, and in need of more work” (2000 III: 22). Assuming 
that the longer a person is unemployed, the lower his search intensity is, Blanchard finds – 
using some back of the envelope calculations – only a very limited quantitative impact of 
long-term unemployment on equilibrium employment.8 Nonetheless, Blanchard is very 
reluctant to abandon hysteresis as a relevant explanation and decides that further research is 
necessary. This holds particularly when we consider the impact of unemployment on wage 
formation. It is probable that unemployment will falls disproportionately on new entrants 
(2000 III: 38). 
 
Ball (1999) develops a very rough model in which he precisely develops Blanchard’s 
proposed extension by assuming: “last fired, first rehired”.9 As a consequence the long-term 
unemployed do not put pressure on wages, although they can be reemployed if demand is 
sufficiently strong (see also Mitchell, 1987). This implies that the bargained real wage will 
increase if the share of long-term unemployment in total unemployment increases. And since 
this share tends to be positively related to total unemployment, the NAIRU will increase when 
unemployment increases. 
 
Ball also presents a very persuasive account of the evolution of unemployment after the oil 
crises. He emphasises the differences in behaviour of the monetary authorities after the 
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recession in the early 1980s, which followed the sharp increase in the interest rates after the 
second oil crisis in 1979. In response to that recession the monetary authorities in both the US 
and Canada lowered their nominal rates of interest strongly, while in Europe the Central 
Banks kept the nominal rate of interest high. As a consequence output growth increased above 
its trend rate for some time in North America and both unemployment and inflation went back 
to their initial levels. However, in Europe output growth remained low, unemployment stayed 
high, and only inflation returned to its previous level. Hence Europe was confronted with a 
higher NAIRU, whereas it remained constant in North America.  Ball conjectures that this is 
due to hysteresis.  
 
To investigate what happened from the mid-1980s onwards, he selects 10 OECD countries (9 
European plus Canada) and looks in particular at what happened in the four countries of that 
sample, which were successful in reducing unemployment. These countries are: Ireland, The 
Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. Ball finds first that there is not a significant relationship 
between labour market institutions and success. The reason is that Ireland and Portugal did 
not introduce institutional reforms at all; the reforms in the Netherlands and the UK were 
relatively minor in his opinion;10 and of the other countries that introduced reforms, no 
significant effect of them could be detected. His second finding is that demand expansions 
play an important role in explaining success stories, both because of the behaviour of 
monetary policy and because of other shocks. These demand expansions pushed 
unemployment rates below the NAIRUs in the success countries, and the low actual 
unemployment then decreased the NAIRU. Not surprisingly the success countries were also 
confronted with a large rises in inflation after the reduction in unemployment, except for 
Ireland. However, these rises were short-lived. The six other countries had lower reductions in 
unemployment and lower inflation.  
 
In terms of the evolution of the NAIRU literature examined, Modigliani (2000) takes the most 
extreme position on the NAIRU-approach. In his view “there is nothing conceptually wrong” 
with that approach, that is, aiming at unemployment smaller than or equal to u*. However, 
“reliance on the NAIRU as an operational approach runs into great problems and involves 
serious risks, because of the enormous difficulties of estimating and tracking u* through 
time”(Modigliani, 2000: 12). Due to unavoidable errors in calculation serious policy mistakes 
then can be made, with “catastrophic” results for unemployment when monetary policy is “in 
the hands of a Central Bank with the framework and mission of the Bundesbank or ECB” 
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(Modigliani, 2000: 14). Thus, the high unemployment in Europe since the mid-eighties is 
“largely the result of a misguided overcautionary monetary policy”(Modigliani, 2000: 14). 
 
Modigliani’s analysis of the causes of European unemployment in the 1980s is rather similar 
to those of Blanchard and Ball presented above. An important difference, however, is how 
this monetary policy has lead to a higher unemployment. While Blanchard stresses the 
indirect route through the relative price of labour with respect to capital, which leads to 
substitution of labour for capital and dominated by an inward shift in demand for labour 
because of a decrease in the capital stock, Ball points at the adverse effect on aggregate 
demand and in particular on its impact on the NAIRU through hysteresis. Modigliani 
emphasises the direct impact of aggregate demand, triggered by a decline in investment. The 
overcautious monetary policy induced a fall in investment below its ‘full employment 
investment ratio’ Through the multiplier mechanism aggregate demand declined and 
unemployment increased.11 Moreover, the shortfall in investment has persisted because 
monetary policy has remained too tight, combined with a tight fiscal policy motivated by the 
Maastricht-criteria. The reason for this overcautious monetary policy is an “obsessive fear of 
inflation” coupled with a “benign neglect policy for unemployment”(Modigliani, 2000: 3), 
which has induced the Bundesbank and later the ECB to overestimate systematically the 
NAIRU. 
 
Modigliani proposes a more expansionary monetary policy, “programmed in collaboration 
with the unions and the employers”(Modigliani, 2000: 14). Moreover, “rigidities in the labour 
market and poor work incentive designs” should be combated too, since these compound the 
effect of insufficient demand (Modigliani, 2000: 15). 
 
It is obvious that our approach is highly sympathetic to Modigliani’s analysis. To provide a 
rough impression of the impact of labour costs on employment, Figure 7 examines the 
relationship between employment and real unit labour costs in Australia and the Netherlands. 
We approximate real unit labour costs by the share of labour income in GDP. The figure 
suggests that there is no unique relationship between the variables. It is interesting to note that 
for Australia in the period 1966 - 1973 the relation virtually is a horizontal line, whereas in 
the Netherlands it is a vertical line in the 1970s. A slightly negative relationship can be 
discerned for Australia in the period 1974 – 1989 and in the Netherlands in the 1980s. Finally 
for both countries the relation in the 1990s is virtually a horizontal line. 
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Figure 7 Employment growth versus wage share, Australia and The Netherlands 
 
0.5
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.6
0.62
0.64
-3.00 -2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
Employment growth % pa
W
ag
e 
Sh
ar
e 
%
1966-1973 1974-1982 1982-1990 1991-2000
 
(a) Australia 1966-2000 
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(b) The Netherlands 1970-2000 
 
Source: Australia – ABS AUSSTATS database, The Netherlands – CPB (2001). Employment growth is the 
(four-quarter) percentage change in total employment and wage share is the percentage share of wages in GDP. 
Quarterly data was used for Australia and annual data for The Netherlands. 
 
When we look at the relationship between unemployment and the wage share, this better 
illustrates that factors other than labour unit costs have caused the enormous rise in 
unemployment that has been witnessed. Figure 8 shows clearly that for both countries the 
initial impact increase in the wage share only had a relatively small impact on unemployment. 
Then the recessions of 1974 and 1982 in Australia caused an enormous increase in 
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unemployment, without hardly any impact on the wage share, the same holds for the recession 
of 1981 in the Netherlands. 
 
When the wage share started to decrease in the mid-1980s in both countries unemployment 
was hardly affected. Finally the wage share has hardly changed in both countries since the 
early 1990s but unemployment declined consistently in the Netherlands and fluctuated in 
Australia. All this illustrates that wage costs factors do not provide a consistently plausible 
explanation of the persistently high unemployment. We conclude that to a large extent, 
demand factors explain the fluctuations in unemployment, and unit labour costs hardly play a 
role. 
 
Figure 8 Unemployment and wage share, Australia and The Netherlands 
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(a) Australia 1966-2000 (b) The Netherlands 1970-2000 
Source: Australia – ABS AUSSTATS database, The Netherlands – CPB (2001). Quarterly data was used for 
Australia and annual data for The Netherlands. 
 
 
5. Policy and business deficiencies in aggregate demand 
 
To help account for the rise in unemployment in both countries it is useful to compute the 
evolution of the GDP gap, indicating the deficiency of aggregate demand. For the 
unemployment rate to remain constant, real GDP growth has to be equal to the sum of labour 
force and labour productivity growth, other things equal. In the midst of on-going debates 
about labour market deregulation, minimum wages and taxation reform, the most salient, 
empirically robust fact that has pervaded the last two decades is that the actual GDP growth 
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rate has rarely reached this required rate. Figure 9 is derived from annual analysis of GDP gap 
components. 
 
Figure 9 GDP and Required GDP, Australia and the Netherlands, 1965-2000 
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(b) The Netherlands 
 
Source: Australia: ABS AUSSTATS Labour Force and National Accounts data. The Netherlands, CPB (2001). 
 
The results are clear. Prior to 1974, the growth rate of GDP was sufficient to match the 
required growth rate set by the growth of the labour force and labour productivity in 
Australia. After that point, GDP growth was never sufficient and unemployment rises and 
falls reflected the history of that deficiency. The same holds for the Netherlands after 1981, 
although the gap closed in the late 1990s which was reflected in the sharp decline in 
unemployment.  
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An interesting question then is: what determines the GDP gap? In our view there are three 
obvious candidates. First, investment, since fluctuations in investment typically drive the 
business cycle. Second, monetary policy through its impact on aggregate expenditures. And 
last but not least, fiscal policy. We will concentrate here on the impact of the first two on 
aggregate demand and discuss the role of fiscal policy in a separate section. 
5.1 Business deficiencies in aggregate demand 
Investment expenditure, which adds to productive capacity, is a key component of aggregate 
demand. Fluctuations in the level of investment drive the business cycle. We should expect a 
close relationship between changes in the investment ratio (investment to GDP) and demand 
aggregates in the labour market, given the analysis presented above. Mitchell (1996) argued 
that the major determining factor accounting for the changes in the level of unemployment in 
the OECD has been movements in the investment ratio. Ball (1999) has also presented 
evidence supportive of this claim. 
 
Figure 10  Public, Private and Aggregate investment ratios, Australia and the Netherlands.  
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(b) The Netherlands 
Source: ABS AUSSTATS database, The Netherlands CPB (2001). Australia data was quarterly and all series 
were smoothed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. The Netherlands used annual data and no smoothing was applied. 
Private investment excludes dwellings and inventory movements. There is also a major difference in the way the 
two countries classify public investment, which makes the relativities difficult to compare. 
 
Figure 10 shows the evolution of the smoothed private, public and aggregate investment ratios 
(investment to GDP). In both countries the aggregate ratio started declining in the early 1970s 
and, despite rising in the recovery from the each recession since, it has failed to return to the 
levels associated with full employment in the 1960s. Of particular note is the continued 
decline in public capital expenditure since the early seventies. In Australia this fall continued 
for the whole period, whereas in the Netherlands the investment share stabilised around the 
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all-time low of 2.5 per cent. The transfer of resources to the private sector in several budgets 
as taxes and government spending fell has not seen the investment ratio for the private sector 
meet the gap left by the public decline. The decline in public capital expenditure as a share of 
GDP is symptomatic of the regime shift that occurred as the NAIRU-era began. We will 
examine this issue further on. 
 
To examine the role of capital expenditure in influencing unemployment, we computed the 
full employment investment ratio as a benchmark for both Australia and the Netherlands.12 
We then computed a full capacity income (GDP*) level based on a Harrodian natural rate of 
growth concept (see Davenport, 1982; Mitchell, 2001). We used this to derive a time series 
for the ratio of actual total investment to full capacity income (I/GDP*). Finally, we 
subtracted this ratio (I/GDP*) from the full employment investment ratio to compute the 
investment shortfall series. This measures for each period (in terms of percent of potential 
GDP) the extent to which I/GDP* falls short of the full employment investment ratio and is a 
measure of demand deficiency.  
 
Figure 11 shows that the relationship between the investment shortfall and the unemployment 
rate is striking. The crucial rise in unemployment Australia in 1974 was preceded by a large 
jump in the investment shortfall, and the same holds for the rise in unemployment in the 
Netherlands in 1981. 
 
Figure 11 Investment shortfall and unemployment rate, Australia and the Netherlands 
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5.2 Monetary policy puzzles 
Taking us through the Keynesian reasoning that investment affects aggregate demand, which 
in turn determines employment and unemployment, Modigliani (2000: 9) concludes, “We 
know from elementary economics that investments are affected by monetary policy (interest 
rates and credit availability). In fact as it is well known, this is the channel par excellence 
through which a Central Bank controls output and inflation. … Indeed, there is no economics 
fundamental that can lead anybody to hold the view that money can directly affect inflation up 
or down except through raising or curbing aggregate demand and thus the demand for labor, 
wages and prices.” We agree with this view, although we think that monetary policy does not 
only affect aggregate demand through its impact on investment, but nowadays it has an 
impact on all spending categories. 
 
Figure 12 Monetary policy, inflation and unemployment, Australia and the Netherlands 
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The Netherlands, 1975-2000 
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(a) Monetary Policy and Unemployment (b) Monetary Policy and Inflation 
Source: Australia, AUSTATS and Reserve Bank Databases, The Netherlands, CPB (2001: B3). 
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Figure 12 provides a version of the history of monetary policy over the last 30 years in 
relation to the evolution of inflation and the unemployment rate. The measure of monetary 
policy shown is the spread between the Official 90-day bill rate and the 10-year Treasury 
bond rate. A high spread indicates a tight monetary policy (see Mitchell, 2001). The inflation 
measure is the annual inflation rate (CPI) and we have also plotted a smoothed inflation series 
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter to measure trend inflation. The left-hand panel in Figure 12 
shows that in Australia the sharp rises in the unemployment rate corresponding to the last 3 
recessions were preceded by sharp tightening in the monetary policy measure. It is puzzling 
why the spread was so high during the period following the 1974 crises when the stock of 
unemployment was building. From the right-hand panel the 1980s and late 1990s stand out as 
worrying examples of mistaken monetary policy. With trend inflation falling throughout the 
decade and the unemployment rate still above acceptable levels, why did the RBA hold the 
spread at such high levels for so long in the 1980s? Further, with inflation well under control 
in the late 1990s, why did the RBA successively push short rates higher? The manifestation of 
this behaviour has now been revealed with the December quarter National Accounts showing 
that GDP growth had become negative.  
 
A similar story can be told for the Netherlands, where the Dutch Central Bank adhered strictly 
to the German Bundesbank’s monetary policy. From the lower panels of Figure 12, we might 
wonder why the spread was so high around the second oil crisis with unemployment 
increasing rapidly and inflation on a downward trend. Further, after the fall of the Wall the 
spread rose to an unprecedented height, creating a recession all over Europe, while 
unemployment was high and inflation was definitely under control. In conclusion, the past 25 
years in Australia and the Netherlands provide plenty of evidence that the Central Banks have 
acted in accordance with Modigliani’s assessment noted above. 
5.3 The impact of policy and business deficiencies on aggregate demand 
We started this section by identifying the GDP-gap for Australia and the Netherlands and 
pointing out the importance of investment behaviour and monetary policy in determining it. 
However, if the OECD Jobs Study (1994) model was convincing we should expect a host of 
supply side variables and others reflecting government regulations and transfer payments to 
be prominent. To examine this further a simple dynamic regression modelling the GDP gap 
was run. The GDP gap was computed using the methodology outlined above and expressed in 
percentage form. We regressed the gap (as the dependent variable) on a range of variables, 
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which capture various supply side, and/or demand side theories contained in the literature. We 
chose to represent the demand side by the measure of monetary policy (SPREAD) and the 
shortfall in investment spending (SHORTFALL) discussed above. A range of supply side 
variables (including real wage costs measures and government benefits) was tried. None of 
the supply side variables were significant.13 
 
Table 3 GDP Gap Regressions, Australia and the Netherlands 
 Australia, 1960:4 to 2000:4 The Netherlands, 1975 - 1999 
 Regressor Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 Constant -0.00 (0.47) -13.91 (0.88) 
 SPREAD(-4) 0.001 (4.45) 6.54 (2.94) 
 SHORTFALL 0.002 (4.12) 524.82 (1.81) 
 YGAP (-1) 0.93 (53.1)   
 D753 -0.01 (2.59)   
 D824 0.02 (3.99)   
     
 R-squared 0.97  0.382080  
 S.E. of regression 0.005  13.34824  
 Mean dependent variable 0.033  8.379545  
Notes: D753 is unity in 1975:3 and zero otherwise. D824 is unity in 1982:4 and zero otherwise. t-statistics in 
parentheses. Both spread and shortfall in the Netherlands are delayed one year. 
 
The tested-down regression is reported in Table 3 for Australia (1960:4 to 2000:4) and the 
Netherlands (1975 to 1999). There is some supportive evidence for The Netherlands, but 
given the limitations of annual data and the short sample available for the SPREAD variable, 
we would not wish to put too much confidence in the results. For Australia, the diagnostics 
for the regression were sound. The regression forecasted satisfactorily out-of-sample over the 
8 quarters. The results confirm that the shortfall in investment as a percentage of GDP was a 
key determinant of the GDP gap over the period examined. In addition, the era of tight 
monetary policy aimed at curbing inflation was also instrumental in maintaining the GDP gap. 
 
6 What if  the private sector can’t provide enough jobs? 
 
Mitchell (2000) argues that in the fifty years since the end of World War II, most OECD 
economies have gone from a situation where the respective governments ensured there were 
enough jobs to maintain full employment to a state where the same governments use 
unemployment to control inflation. A major aspect of this move has been the changes that 
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have occurred in public sector employment. Many economies have undergone substantial 
restructuring of their public sectors with significant employment losses being endured. Table 
4 shows that in Australia, the labour force has grown at an average compound rate of 1.87 per 
cent per annum since 1970. Over the same period, private employment has averaged 1.91 per 
cent per annum, whereas public employment has averaged a rate of growth of 0.64 per cent 
per annum (driven heavily by the growth in the 1970-75 period). Since 1990, the public sector 
has declined in absolute employment every year with a rapid –2.03 per cent per annum 
average decline since 1995.  
 
Over the 30-year period from 1970, private employment growth in the Netherlands was 1.05 
per cent per annum. Like Australia, it kept up with labour force growth of 1.13 per cent. 
Dutch public sector growth lagged behind with a growth rate of 0.85 per cent per annum After 
an upsurge in growth until the mid-1980s, employment growth in the Dutch public sector was 
virtually flat over the 1990s. As a consequence, the share of public employment rose in the 
Netherlands from 11.1 per cent of total employment to 14.7 per cent in 1985. Afterwards it 
fell back to just below its initial level, 10.7 per cent in 1999. So the pattern is similar to 
Australia except that the public sector deficiency is less damaging because the Dutch labour 
force growth is substantially below that of Australia. 
 
Table 4 Growth rates in labour market aggregates, Australia and the Netherlands, 1970-1999 
  Public Employment 
Growth 
Private Employment 
Growth 
Total Employment  
Growth 
Labour Force 
Growth 
 Australia 0.64 1.91 1.67 1.87 
 The Netherlands 0.85 1.08 1.05 1.13 
Notes: Growth rates are annual average compound rates for the periods shown. UGAP is unemployment minus 2 
per cent of the Labour Force to capture frictional unemployment. For a full account of this data and OECD 
comparisons see Mitchell (2000c). 
 
With private sector employment growing more or less commensurately with the labour force, 
the withdrawal of public sector employment has contributed significantly to the persistently 
high unemployment that Australia has experienced. As we have already indicated above, the 
Netherlands has partially eliminated this problem by shifting a large number of workers into 
the disabled category. That is, they do not show up in the official unemployment figures. If 
the governments expected the private sector to provide commensurately more jobs as public 
sector employment was cut, then they were wrong – in particular for Australia. The 
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magnitude of private employment growth necessary to compensate for the public sector losses 
has been historically unattainable on any sustained basis.  
 
To motivate this statement we use the framework developed in Mitchell (2000c). Full 
employment is taken to mean the provision of enough public and private jobs to match labour 
supply14minus some constant proportion α of frictional unemployment15 – the remaining 
unemployment is and demand-deficient unemployment. We define the private employment 
gap, PGAP as the level of public employment required to achieve full employment once 
private employment is determined. If public employment is below PGAP, then demand-
deficient unemployment will be positive and the economy departs from full employment. 
Accordingly, we define the unemployment gap (UGAP) as the difference between PGAP and 
actual public employment. 16 So the greater the increase in the private employment gap, the 
greater must the rate of growth in public employment for demand-deficient unemployment to 
remain constant. UGAP will be positive if private and/or public employment are insufficient 
to match the labour force (net of frictional unemployment). With reasonable assumptions 
made about labour force growth (conditioned by the magnitudes common since the mid-
1970s) and the cyclical nature of private employment growth, it becomes manifestly obvious 
that sustained full employment requires a robust and counter-cyclical public employment 
growth rate.  
 
Applying this framework to the Australia and the Netherlands yields the results shown in 
Figure 13. By failing to expand public employment, at least in line with labour force growth, 
the governments have allowed unemployment to persist at high levels.  In this context, we say 
that at any point in time the government chooses the level of unemployment. Mitchell (2000c) 
simulated the evolution of unemployment in Australia assuming that the public sector 
employment grew in proportion with the labour force over the 1970-2000 period. The results 
were striking. Unemployment in 2000 would be below frictional levels.  
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Figure 13 PGAP, Public Employment and UGAP in Australia and the Netherlands 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
th
ou
sa
nd
s
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
th
ou
sa
nd
s
PGAP (LH axis)
Public (LH axis)
UGAP (RH axis)
 
 
(a) Australia, 1970-2000 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
th
ou
sa
nd
s
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
th
ou
sa
nd
s
PGAP
Public EmploymentUGAP
 
(b) The Netherlands, 1970-2000 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database, 1960-2000. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have demonstrated that employment and outcomes in both Australia and the Netherlands, 
are predominantly driven by aggregate demand. There is strong evidence to support this 
contention. The robustness of the results is strengthened by the fact that the two countries 
exhibit considerable diversity in economic structure. Despite all the labour market and related 
supply-side reforms that have been introduced in Australia over the last 15 years, the 
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unemployment rate persists at high levels due to demand deficiency. In the same way demand 
deficiencies can explain to a large extent the fluctuations in the Dutch unemployment rate.  
Moreover, the apparent Dutch success in combating unemployment is partly clouded by the 
huge increase in inactivity since the early 1980s.  
 
This demand deficiency reflects several factors: (a) declines in the investment ratio, (b) 
declines in public sector employment. Both have been exacerbated by deflationary 
macroeconomic policy since 1975, which has ensured that the persistently high 
unemployment was inevitable. We have illustrated for Australia and the Netherlands that 
these factors indeed have played an important role in the determination of aggregate demand. 
 
Finally we have argued that the conventional NAIRU approach tends to neglect the role of 
aggregate demand and focuses on the supply side. However, it turns out that both employment 
and unemployment are very poorly correlated to wage costs, which are the driving force 
according to the NAIRU approach. Hence the overall conclusion of our paper is that the 
demand side of the economy should be taken much more seriously than usually is the case. 
 
The policy implications of all this are quite obvious. First it should be recognised that due to 
excessive fear of inflation, it tends to follow a deflationary policy by setting the interest rate 
too high. Second, the public sector should take a much more active role in employment 
creation. Mitchell (1998) has proposed that a job guarantee be introduced by the public sector 
as a permanent solution to unemployment. 
 
While our empirical evidence is convincing, there is a need  for further more rigorous 
research into the demand side determinants of unemployment. We hope that we will succeed 
in focusing the interest of the profession more in that direction. 
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1 Professor of Economics and Director of Centre of Full Employment and Equity and Professor of Economics, 
University of Maastricht, respectively. 
2 The lower number for the Netherlands when compared to Australia is due to both the lower rate of 
unemployment in the Netherlands and the possible underreporting of vacancies in Australia: the Dutch vacancy 
figures are not based on voluntary reporting by firms, but on survey data. 
3 Note that due to limitations in the long-term unemployment data (starting March 1978) we have only been able 
to consider the last two recessions in Australia. 
4 Taking unemployment as the dependent variable, reflects our contention that unemployment is determined by 
demand for labour. When interpreted in terms of the employment function, where employment is determined by 
demand and supply of labour simultaneously (Muysken et al., 1994), this implies that we assume that demand 
for labour should follow supply of labour. Otherwise demand for labour is insufficient. 
5 For Australia we ignored long-term unemployment in the first period, since it was neglible anyhow. 
6 In fact, it was Carlin and Soskice (1990), who introduced the BRW-PRW model structure into the NAIRU 
literature. 
7 Actually, Blanchard (1999: 29) dubs this the “Modigliani puzzle” which he leaves for further research. 
8 In our view this is unsurprising given that usually only a small percentage of unemployment could be construed 
as arising from search factors. 
9 This is the way Nordhaus characterises Ball’s analysis in his comment. 
10 In our view, that is an understatement. 
11 The multiplier mechanism is relevant in Europe because of the downward wage rigidity (p.4). 
12 For Australia we took the average of the investment ratio (total capital investment to GDP) for March 1970 to 
December 1971 (16.4 per cent). For the Netherlands we took the investment ratio for 1970 (20.6 per cent). 
13 Actually we could only do this for Australia, since the data for the Netherlands were not available on a 
quarterly basis, and the time series on an annual basis was too short.. 
14 Labour supply in this context is equal to the current labour force, although we clearly recognise the importance 
of marginal workers not in the labour force.   
15 Frictional embraces structural factors. These factors are sometimes differentiated by spatial and skill-mismatch 
factors. The latter is somewhat contentious because in a tight labour market firms usually offer jobs with 
appropriate training implicit. A coherent regional policy with an active public sector labour market will also 
reduce the spatial imbalances significantly. 
16 We have L= P + Pg + U  where L is the labour force and P is total private employment, Pg is total public 
employment, and U is total unemployment. U is the sum of frictional unemployment (Uf) and demand-deficient 
unemployment (Ud). Then PGAP = [L(1 - α) – P] = Pg + Ud  and UGAP = Ud  = PGAP – Pg . 
